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Impeachment Blaira-zbrodnie dot.ataku na Irak
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narmi
: http://www.irak.pl
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02-09-2004 10:54
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Materiały wstępne do
Impeachmentu Blair'a
za zbrodnie i wykroczenia
dotyczące inwazji na Irak
A Case to Answer
A first report on the potential impeachment of the
Prime Minister for High Crimes and
Misdemeanours in relation to the invasion of Iraq.
Produced for
Adam Price MP
August 2004
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A Case to Answer
A first report on the potential impeachment of the
Prime Minister for High Crimes and
Misdemeanours in relation to the invasion of Iraq.
Produced for
Adam Price MP
Authors
Chapter I: Glen Rangwala and Dan Plesch
Chapter II: Dan Plesch
With the assistance of Ffion Evans, John Fellows and Gwenllian Griffiths
Glen Rangwala is a lecturer in politics at Newnham College, Cambridge.
Dan Plesch is an Honorary Fellow of Birkbeck College, University of
London and a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the University of Keele.
He is the author of the recently published The Beauty Queens’ Guide to
World Peace.
On the 26th August 2004, a group of MPs published a report on the potential impeachment of the Prime Minister for High Crimes and Misdemeanours in relation to the invasion of Iraq.
The report sets out compelling evidence of deliberate repeated distortion, seriously misleading statements and culpable negligence on the part of the Prime Minister. This misconduct is in itself more than sufficient to require his resignation. Further to this, the Prime Minister’s conduct has also destroyed the United Kingdom’s reputation for honesty around the world; it has produced a war with no end in sight; it has damaged and discredited the intelligence services which are essential to the security of the state; it has undermined the constitution by weakening cabinet government to breaking point and it has made a mockery of the authority of Parliament as representatives of the people. The core conclusion of this report is that the impeachment of the Prime Minister has a strong basis in fact, and established precedent in parliamentary law.
Table of Contents
Paragraph Page
Introduction
1 - 5 1
Chapter I
6 – 221 5
1. The Prime Minister's statements on Iraq's weapons that were
unsupported by the intelligence assessments available to him
11 – 103 7
1.1 Claims made about the existence of Iraq's NBC weapons before
intelligence had assessed that Iraq possessed these weapons
14 – 22 8
1.2 Claims about a "threat" from Iraq's weapons
23 – 45 10
1.3 Claims that weapons and material that were unaccounted for still
existed
46 - 55 14
1.4 Claims of an escalating NBC programme
56 – 64 16
1.5 Claims about the work of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and the "material
breach" of Security Council Resolution 1441
65 - 93 18
1.6 Claims made about items found in Iraq after April 2003
94 – 103 26
2. Failure to disclose available counter-evidence, and to ensure
claims were verified
104 – 169 28
2.1 Sources who gave a different account
106 – 116 28
2.2 Investigation of intelligence sources
117 – 124 30
2.3 Limitations of intelligence sources
125 – 135 32
2.4 Assessment that Iraq would not use weapons outside its own
territory unless attacked
136 – 153 35
2.5 Non-evaluation of the Iraqi declaration made in December 2002
154 – 161 38
2.6 Not telling the public and Parliament about other threats
162 – 169 40
3. Failure to withdraw material found to be false, or which should
have been found to be false
170 – 200 43
3.1 Evaluating past intelligence after the re-introduction of inspectors
170 – 182 43
3.2 Discredited sources
183 – 194 46
3.3 Interfering with reporting from US-led inspection process to
prevent past statements being discredited
195 – 200 48
4. Making a secret agreement with President Bush to remove 201 – 221 51
Saddam Hussein by force if necessary
Chapter 11
222 – 274 59
Impeachment
222 – 223 59
1. Summary
224 - 230 59
2. The law and procedure of impeachment today
231 – 232 62
3. Impeachable offences in their historical context
233 – 251 64
3.1 Most recent cases
233 – 235 64
3.2 The first impeachment trials
236 – 237 64
3.3 Impeachment revived in the 1600s to stop absolute monarchy in
England
238 – 242 65
3.4 The eighteenth century - Burke v Hastings and the American copy
of impeachment
243 – 246 67
3.5 Twentieth century discussions
247 – 251 68
4. Impeachment as a last resort to hold the Prime Minister to
account
252 – 260 71
5. The impeachable offences of the Prime Minister
261 – 274 73
5.1 Misleading Parliament and the country and failing to resign in
consequence
262 – 266 73
5.2 Making a secret agreement with the President of the United States
regarding the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
267 – 269 74
5.3 Undermining the Constitution
270 74
5.4 Negligence and incompetence
271 – 273 74
5.5 Useful precedents when considering the conduct of the Prime
Minister
274 75
Annex A
79
Annex B
83
Annex C
93
1
Introduction
1. This report was commissioned because of the great concern of Members of
Parliament and the public over the misconduct of the Prime Minister concerning the
invasion of Iraq and the apparent impossibility of any effective parliamentary
accountability. The report details the Prime Minister's misconduct and finds that, all
other constitutional remedies having failed, it would be possible for the Prime
Minister to be impeached.
2. The first chapter of the report examines the statements and actions of the Prime
Minister from September 2001 to August 2004 relating to Iraq. In particular, it finds
that the Prime Minister:
- exaggerated the condition of Iraq's illicit weapons well beyond the assessments of
the intelligence services or the United Nations inspectors. He asserted in early
2002 that Iraq had "stockpiles of major amounts of chemical and biological
weapons", whilst the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time
was that Iraq "may have hidden small quantities of agents and weapons" (section
1.1);
- claimed that "Saddam Hussein poses a severe threat not just to the region, but to
the wider world" and had "enough chemical and biological weapons remaining to
devastate the entire Gulf region", whilst the intelligence assessment was that
"Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his neighbours" (section 1.2);
- asserted that the "UN proved" he had chemical and biological weapons because
they were unaccounted for, in contrast to the warning by the executive chairman
of UNMOVIC Hans Blix that "One must not jump to the conclusion that they
[weapons that were unaccounted for] exist" (section 1.3);
- claimed that Iraq's "WMD programme is active, detailed and growing", even
though he later admitted to the Butler review team that intelligence showed that
"what had changed was not the pace of Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes,
which had not been dramatically stepped up" (section 1.4).
- insisted that the invasion of Iraq was lawful because Iraq had committed a
"material breach" of Security Council Resolution 1441 by not cooperating with
inspectors, even though Hans Blix told the Security Council that "the numerous
initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some
long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as 'active', or even
'proactive'" (section 1.5).
2
- claimed after the invasion that "our intelligence" had confirmed that Iraq's "two
mobile biological weapons facilities" were part of a larger set of such facilities,
even though intelligence had yet to examine the trailers, and then found them
unconnected to biological weapons programmes (section 1.6);
- held back crucial information from intelligence sources that indicated that Iraq had
destroyed its weapons stockpile (section 2.1);
- failed to ensure that intelligence sources were adequately checked, even when
straightforward measures could have been taken to check those sources (section
2.2);
- claimed that the intelligence available to him was "extensive, detailed and
authoritative", even though he had been briefed by the Chief of MI6 about how
key sources should be treated with caution (section 2.3);
- did not reveal the intelligence assessment in his possession that Iraq would be
unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons outside its territory unless attacked
first, despite the significance of this assessment (section 2.4);
- declared that the Iraqi declaration of December 2002 was "false", even though he
had not asked for that declaration to be analysed fully by the intelligence services
(section 2.5);
- warned that "it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction come together", even though the intelligence
assessment was that the "greatest terrorist threat to Western interests … would be
heightened by military action against Iraq", and the government was later forced
to admit that "the JIC assessed that any collapse of the Iraqi regime would
increase the risk of chemical and biological warfare technology or agents finding
their way in to the hands of terrorists, and that the Prime Minister was aware of
this" (section 2.6);
- claimed in March 2003 that the contents of the September dossier "still accurately
reflect our assessment of the position with regard to Iraq's proscribed weapons
programmes", even though those inspectors found a large number of the claims in
it to be false (section 3.1);
- affirmed in January 2004 that "the intelligence we received [prior to the war] is
correct", even though the intelligence services had raised doubts about at least
four key sources from at least six months earlier (section 3.2); and
3
- gave his support to the then chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee in
interfering with the compilation of a report by the Iraq Survey Group, with the aim
of preventing the extent of past mistakes from being made public (section 3.3).
3. The report finds that there is strong evidence that the Prime Minister committed his
support to President Bush for an invasion of Iraq in 2002. He did this in the
knowledge that the US administration had already decided to oust Saddam Hussein,
regardless of any progress on the issue of Iraq's weapons (section 4)..
4. The second chapter of the report finds that impeachment proceedings could be
begun in order to hold the Prime Minister to account for his misconduct in relation to
the Iraq war. It is unprecedented in modern times for a minister to remain in office
when faced with such strong evidence of misconduct. All the usual methods of
enforcing the authority of Parliament have failed to operate, and therefore, it is
necessary to consider what other legal measures are available to Parliament.
Authoritative texts on United Kingdom constitutional law describe impeachment as
the ultimate means by which Parliament may exercise its legal authority to hold the
government to account. Given that impeachment has not been used in recent times;
this report provides a brief history of impeachment before considering the grounds for
impeaching the Prime Minister.
5. It is for Parliament to decide whether the Prime Minister should be impeached. We
consider that this report shows that there is a case of impeachable offences for the
Prime Minister to answer.
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